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I. Executive Overview
The Judicial Council of South Carolina requested that the state's
Administrative Law Judge Division statute be reviewed. The statute
has been in effect for five years, and sufficient experience has been
gained to examine its operation.' Three topics are covered. The first
is whether there should be any review, by the agency, of Administrative
Law Judges (ALJ) decisions in contested cases. The present statute
provides that the ALJ's decision in about 75% of the contested cases is
the final agency action, subject to limited judicial review in the circuit
court. However, ALJ decisions involving the Department of Health and
Environmental Control (DHEC), the Office of Ocean and Coastal
Resource Management (OCRM), a part of DHEC, and the Department
of Natural Resources (DNR) may be appealed and reviewed by the
agency, which can alter or amend the AL's decision under a limited
The Judicial Council is a statutory body authorized to study the
administration of justice and recommend changes to the legislature and courts. 'See
S.C. Code Ann §§ 14-27-10 to 100 (1976 & Supp. 1997). This report was prepared
by Professor James F. Flanagan, University of South Carolina School of Law, at the
direction of the Judicial Council and reprinted with its permission.
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scope of review.2 The agency's decision is then subject to judicial
review in the circuit court.
The present statute was enacted, in part, to correct the problems
that occurred when agency boards and commissions had unrestricted
review of the decisions of hearing officers. There were substantial
concerns about how ultimate decisions were made and the regularity of
procedures. The present system appears to be working well. In all
cases, the AU Division provides a decision-maker who is neutral and
independent from the agency involved, and one who can render a final
decision promptly. In most cases the AL's decision is the final agency
action. In three instances the AL's decision may be reviewed by the
agency. This limited agency review also appears to be working well.
Agency review of AU decisions occurs infrequently, and apparently
only on matters of particular importance to the agency. There is some
indication that the agency board reviewing the appeal may not be
strictly observing the legal standard of review in the statute, but
experience is limited to date.
The AJ statute and the Division have clearly resolved concerns
about the regularity of the administrative decision making process.
However, the AJ's unique independence from the agencies, and within
the Division itself, while remedying the major defects in the prior
system, has the unexpected consequence that contested case decisions
by the AU may be inconsistent with previously established agency
policy. This makes it more difficult to predict the outcome of cases,
encourages litigation, and introduces uncertainty in the administration
of agency programs. It is difficult to define the scope of the problem,
and while it is clearly less significant than the issues which required
reform, it is an issue of some importance in the administrative process.
Any decision to modify the current structure on agency review
is ultimately a policy decision by the legislature that balances the need
for consistent policy application, the determination of which entity
should be responsible for policy determination, and the time, expense
and effect of agency review.
2 Executive departments governed by boards or commissions may review
ALJ decisions. Executive departments governed by a single director may not. S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-23-610(A) (Supp. 1997). Approximately 25% of the ALJ Division's
case load comes from agencies governed by a board or commission and consequently
75% of ALJ decisions are the final agency action. See infra, note 35.
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The second issue considered is the appropriate court to review
the final agency action. Presently, all appeals of final agency action,
whether made by the ALJ or by the agency upon review, are filed in the
circuit court. This creates a three-step procedure for judicial review in
which the circuit court, court of appeals and the supreme court all may
review, and all apply the same standard mandated by the Administrative
Procedures Act. (APA). Appeals from professional licensing decisions
are a four-step process because the initial appeal is to the Division and
then to the circuit court, and then to the appellate courts. There is
nothing inherent in these cases that requires a multi-level review, and
a direct appeal to the appellate courts is recommended.
The third issue is the enforcement of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. The ALJ statute makes all ALJs subject to the Code of
Judicial Conduct found in SCACR 501, and directs the State Ethics
Commission to enforce that Code through the procedures of the State
Ethics Act. The result is a duplicate set of standards for ALJs
governing the same conduct. The legislature adopted a different
approach for members of the judiciary and limited the State Ethics
Act's application to matters relating to reporting and campaign finance
involving the judiciary. A similar approach for ALJs is recommended.
Also, the current statute makes the sanctions under the State Ethics Act
available for violations of the Judicial Code. This stitching together of
standards from one source and sanctions from another appears to create
a result which is inappropriate for ALJs.
HI. Introduction
A. Background
The ALJ Division was created by Act 181 of 1993 as part of the
restructuring of state government.' A major purpose was to improve
' Prior to 1993 South Carolina's executive agencies were those under the
constitutional officers, the Secretary of State, State Treasurer, Controller General,
Attorney General, Superintendent of Education and Commissioner of Agriculture,
Adjutant General and approximately 145 other agencies governed by boards or
commissions. Most of the boards and commissions served part-time. Appointments
were generally with legislative approval, although some were exclusively
gubernatorial and some exclusively legislative appointments. See South Carolina
Commission on Government Restructuring, Modernizing South Carolina State
Government for the Twenty-First Century 33-39 (1991). No change was made in the
constitutional offices. However, the Act created the ALJ Division and consolidated
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administrative practice, and to provide a standard method of
administrative procedure, particularly in contested case adjudications.
Prior contested cases were heard by hearing officers appointed by the
relevant agency for a particular case. This approach was criticized for
a lack of established and consistent procedures, and by claims of
irregular and secretive proceedings, over-reliance on agency staff, and
the failure to separate the advisory function of the agency staff from the
agency's adjudicative function.
The legislature made two decisions to cure the perceived defects
in the prior administrative procedure. First, the General Assembly
elects all ALJs for a specific term to the Administrative Law Division
(Division), an independent agency within the Executive Department.
They are neither employees, nor permanently assigned to the agency
whose cases they hear. The ALJs meet the same qualifications as
members of the judiciary. By statute, the ALJs rotate among the
agencies providing the AUs a broader administrative experience, and
the agencies more professional and neutral decision-makers. The
Division is a substantial improvement over the prior system. South
Carolina's creation of a central panel of independent ALJs followed
other jurisdictions.4
Second, the legislature gave the ALJs unique independence in
many adjudications. South Carolina's ALJs are authorized to render the
final agency decision in about 75% of their cases, subject only to
judicial review by the circuit court. This approach is an exception to
the general rule in both federal and state governments, as well as in
South Carolina before the Division was created, that the AL's
seventy-five agencies into seventeen executive departments led by individuals
appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. Five
departments remain governed by boards and commissions appointed by the governor
with the advice and consent of the Senate: Department of Natural Resources;
Department of Health and Environmental Control; Department of Transportation;
Department of Mental Health and Department of Disabilities and Special Needs. See
James H. Hodges, The Restructuring Act of 1993 -- Has the Ben Tillman Era Been
Pitchforked? S.C. Lawyer Sept/Oct 1993 at 18.
' The following jurisdictions have central panels of ALJs: Arizona,
California, Colorado, Georgia, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, City of New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington,
Wisconsin and Wyoming.
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decision in a contested case is subject to review and revision by the
affected agency, and that decision thereafter becomes the final agency
decision.5 AIJ decisions involving DHEC and DNR may be appealed
to those agencies, albeit, under a limited standard of review that is
comparable to that provided by the judicial branch when the case is
reviewed in the circuit court.
B. An Overview of Agency Review of A.J Decisions in
Other Jurisdictions
The rationale for the agency's review of an AL's decision in a
contested case is that the legislature delegated to that agency the
responsibility for enforcing a particular statutory scheme and
determining and applying legislative policy to those regulated.
Contested cases often raise important policy questions that could not
have been anticipated, or are not covered by the regulations, or because
the cases are unusually complex.6  The agency, as the statutorily
authorized entity, should review contested cases to determine these
policy issues. A second, and equally important, justification for agency
review of contested cases is that it provides consistency in decision-
making, so that factually similar cases are decided the same way.
Agency review of ALJ decisions, while de novo in theory, is
often considerably less so in practice. In some states, the findings of
the AUI must be given deference. For example, Colorado provides that
findings of evidentiary fact, as distinguished from ultimate conclusions,
will not be set aside unless contrary to the weight of the evidence.7
5 See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1988); See e.g., Hunter v. Patrick Construction
Co., 289 S.C. 46, 344 S.E.2d 613 (1986). There are exceptions to the general rule.
For example, at the Social Security Administration, the AL's decision can be
reviewed by an appeals panel which renders the final agency decision. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.981 (1998). Some states make the AL's decision final, subject only to
judicial review, in limited instances. See Mo. Ann Stat. §§ 621.015 - 621.189 (West
1988 & Supp. 1996) (contested licensing cases, appeals from the decisions of the
director of revenue, and certain rule-making decisions that are not contested cases);
See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4 §§ 1151-58 (West 1989) (Administrative Court has
jurisdiction to hear agency initiated actions to revoke or suspend licenses). Other
states permit, but do not require, the agency to delegate to the AD the power to make
a final decision. See Ga. Code Ann. § 50-13-42 (b) (1994) (State Personnel Board,
by rule, may provide that the ALJ decision is final).
6 See S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).
7 See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-4-105(15)(b) (1990).
Washington state requires the ALJ to identify findings that are based
upon an evaluation of the credibility of the witness,' so that those
findings will be given greater deference on agency appeal. South
Carolina limits the agency review unless there is no substantial
evidence to support the findings of fact or there has been an error of
law.9 Texas provides that findings of fact and conclusions of law may
be changed only for reasons of policy.'
A second approach to agency review of ALJ decisions, found
principally in the federal government, is the use of specialized bodies
within the agency to hear the appeal. The specialized appeal body
provides for agency input and consistency of decision-making and
reduces the opportunity for arbitrary decision-making by political
appointees. For example, the Postal Services uses a designated
Judicial Officer to review ALJ decisions, and the Judicial Officer's
decision becomes the final agency decision." The Social Security
Administration has a 24-member panel that reviews between 50,000
and 80,000 determinations and renders the final agency decision.'
2
Other departments have review boards, but with the provision that the
agency may review cases. For example, the FCC's review board's
decisions are the final agency action unless they are reversed by that
Commission which reserves the right to decide all policy questions and
such questions must be certified to it. 3
This brief summary of other administrative law statutes suggests
there is no preferred model of agency review. Moreover, even if agency
review is provided, the reality is that in many situations the scope of the
review of ALJ decisions is limited. Any analysis of the desirability or
necessity of agency review should consider that it occurs relatively
infrequently and may serve limited purposes.
8 See Wash. Rev. Code. § 34.05.461(c)(3) (1990).
' See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(D) (Supp. 1997).
'o See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.058 (West 1997).
" See 39 U.S.C. § 204 (1988); 39 C.F.R. § 226.2(e) (1995).
12 See generally, Russell L. Weaver, Appellate Review in Executive
Departments and Agencies, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 251, 255-57 (1996) (hereinafter
referred to as Weaver). The appeals council judges hear cases individually. If the
judge decides to overturn the AU decision the matter is randomly referred to another
judge. If both agree, the case is resolved. If they disagree, a third judge reviews the
matter, and the majority decision becomes the final agency action.
13 See Weaver, supra note 12, at 263-64.
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II. The South Carolina AU Review Procedure
A. AU as Final Adjudicator
The AU's decision in a contested case is the final decision of
every administrative agency headed by a director, that is subject to the
Act. The contested case is a de novo trial proceeding in which the ALJ
makes their own findings of fact in a contested case hearing. 4
Likewise, the AU makes independent conclusions of law in deciding
the matter. The ALJ, of course, is bound to follow the statutes and
regulations when the issue is clear.'5
1. The AU and Agency Policy
The issue, however, is not the application of well-established
law to uncontradicted facts, but applying the law when the facts present
new, novel or unanticipated situations. Then, the determination of
policy becomes paramount. On this issue, South Carolina's model
emphasizes the independent decision making of the ALL. 6  The
affected agency is an advocate that must persuade the AU of the
validity of its interpretation of the applicable law and regulations. The
AU statute does not provide any specific direction to the AU regarding
the deference, if any, to be accorded to the agency's legal position. 7
This lack of statutory direction, the Division's status as an independent
agency, and the statutory command to the AU to make independent
findings of fact and conclusions of law, however, all lead to the
inference that the AU is free to accord such deference as the judge
deems appropriate in a particular case.
The full extent of this freedom in policy matters can be seen in
"4 See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-320(d) (Supp. 1997); Rule 29(B), Rules of
Procedure for the AU Division.
"5 See Faile v. S.C. Employment Security Division, 267 S.C. 536, 230 S.E.2d
219 (1976).
16 See Hon. Marvin F. Kittrell, ALJs in South Carolina, S.C. Lawyer
(May/June 1996) at 42, 43. The advantages of ALJ independence from the agency
are also discussed in William B. Swent, South Carolina's ALJ: Central Panel,
Administrative Court, or a Little of Both? 48 S.C. L. REv. 1 (1996).
17 The ALJ may take judicial notice of "generally recognized technical or
scientific facts within the agency's specialized knowledge." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-
330(4) (1976). However, that provision is discretionary, and applies to factual and
technical knowledge rather than policy interpretations.
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cases in which the ALJ may alter the fines imposed by the agency. 8
The amount of the fine for an admitted violation is a central aspect of
enforcement policy. The amount is an agency judgment about the
seriousness of the violation, the relative importance of the violation in
the regulatory scheme, as well as a need to be consistent in factually
similar cases. The amount of the fine is clearly an issue on which the
agency brings to bear important institutional considerations. Yet, the
agency's decision can be altered by any AU in three-fourths of the
contested cases heard by the Division.
One consequence of South Carolina's administrative procedure
is that it can create uncertainty and inconsistency between the
regulatory policy articulated by the agency, and the policy ultimately
enforced by the ALJ in contested cases. Two issues flow from this
situation. First, the potential for changing an agency decision through
adjudication may lead to more contested cases. Second, there is the
question of who should make those policy decisions, the agency
charged with the enforcement of the statutory scheme, or a neutral
decision-maker who brings a broader perspective to the issue. There is
no "correct" answer to these questions because they go to the key issue
of what is expected of administrative agencies, and what is expected of
a central panel of ALJs. Moreover, the decision must be made in the
context of South Carolina's experience where unlimited agency review
did not work well.
2. Consistency of Decisions within the Division
Another, and perhaps more significant factor, introducing
uncertainty is the standard rule of precedent that a decision of one AU
is persuasive, but not binding authority, on other ALJs. Judicial
rotation among agencies means that an issue involving one agency may
be decided differently by different judges. The issue is not that the AU
decides, or that one decision is better than another, but that there are
different interpretations of the same issue. The uncertainty affects all
cases involving the agency, both before and after they become contested
cases.
There is no formal or informal procedure for establishing
consistency of interpretation on recurring issues in contested cases.
"8 See, e.g., South Carolina Dept of Revenue and Taxation v. Rainbow Inn
and Deli, 95-ALJ-17-0178-CC (Dec. 29, 1995) (finding violation but reducing fine).
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Judicial review is not effective in restoring consistency of
interpretation. The number of appeals reaching the courts is very small,
and the likelihood that issues of consistency will be preserved and
resolved is even smaller. This also creates an incentive among litigants
to seek contested cases because of that uncertainty. Other judicial
bodies have faced this problem. The South Carolina Court of Appeals,
which sits in panels of three judges, adopted rules permitting a majority
of the judges to order rehearings in banc "when consideration by the full
court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions or
(2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional
importance."19
B. AU Decisions Reviewed by an Agency
An ALJ's decision can be reviewed by an agency in three
instances. DHEC, (with appeal to the DHEC Board), the Office of
Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (with appeal to the Coastal
Zone Management Appellate Panel) and the Department of Natural
Resources, (with appeal to the DNR Board) may review the ALJ's
decision in a contested case.2' The scope of review is limited by statute.
Section 1-23-610(D) provides:
(D) The review of an administrative law judge's order
must be confined to the record. The reviewing tribunal
may affirm the decision or remand the case for further
proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if
the substantive rights of the petitioner have been
prejudiced because the finding, conclusion, or decision
is:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory
'9 Rule 219 SCACR Hearing of Cases by the Court of Appeals En Banc;
See also, Burbach v. Investors Mgt. Corp., 326 S.C. 488, 484 S.E.2d 119 (Ct. App.
1997).
2 The DNR contested cases involve violations of licensing statutes and
regulations which are based upon criminal trials for the same violations. Therefore,
there is little for the ALI to do, and little reason to appeal the decision to the agency.
See Benjamin T. Zeigler, The South Carolina Administrative Law Judge Division and
the Limits of Central Panel Decision-Making Power (1997) 46, 47 and n.167
(hereinafter Zeigler) (Copy on file with author of this report). This raises the question
of the necessity of any intermediate review of these decision, before review by the
courts.
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provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency;
(c) made upon an unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative and substantial evidence on the whole
record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.
The standard of review in § 1-23-610(D) follows the language
of the general judicial review provision for administrative law decisions
found in S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 1997), with one
exception. The AU statute does not include the first sentence of § 1-
23-380: "The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."
21
However, for all practical purposes the standard of review is the same
under both statutes.
Two issues arise from applying the judicial standard of review
to agencies reviewing ALJ decisions. Section 1-23-380 contains a
deferential standard of review and requires courts to defer to
administrative agency decisions. The limited scope of review of factual
findings is justified by the agency's expertise in the matter.22 There is
a similar deference in the agency's interpretation of its statute. "The
construction of a statute by the agency charged with executing it is
entitled to the most respectful consideration and should not be
overruled without cogent reasons."23  The doctrine of separation of
powers also limits judicial review of the actions of an executive
21 The omission may support the argument that the board or commission has
greater power to find facts, but, subpart (e) refers to the substantial evidence standard
which indicates that the board's review of facts is limited.
22 See Board of Bank Control v. Thomason, 236 S.C. 158, 169, 113 S.E.2d
544, 549 (1960). "The agency's experience, technical competence and specialized
knowledge may be utilized in the evaluation of the evidence." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-
330(4) (1986).
2 Faile v. S.C. Employment Security Comm., 267 S.C. 536, 540, 230 S.E.2d
219, 221-22 (1976) (citations omitted).
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agency.4
The rationale for requiring courts to defer to factual and policy
determinations by the agency is a consequence of the policy decision
that the agency, not the court, is responsible for enforcing the statutory
scheme. The court's role is to ensure procedural fairness and a review
of legal questions. This rationale does not necessarily require deference
to an AU decision, particularly when it is the agency, with its greater
expertise and experience in the subject, conducting the review of policy
judgments.
Second, the statutory standard of review is a legal standard. In
effect, the agency is to reverse the AU only if there has been an error
of law, but not if it is a question of fact, or matter within the discretion
of the decision-maker, so long as the decision is not arbitrary and
capricious. Thus, the statute commands the board of an agency, which
is normally concerned with policy issues, not to make policy decisions,
but to apply legal standards.25
As might be expected in the application of a new statute, it is
not clear that the standard always is being applied as drafted. As of
January 1, 1998, there have been only six instances in which the agency
has overturned an ALJ's decision. In one instance, the major ground
appears to be an error of law because the AU imposed a condition that
had been repealed.26 In other instances the agency reversed the ALJ's
decisions because of differences in the interpretation of regulations.
While that arguably might be considered an error of law, it has been
maintained that the agency decisions are inconsistent with the review
statute because the agency was overturning a matter now committed to
the discretion of the AU. None of these cases have received judicial
review and there are no opinions providing guidance on whether they
are properly decided under the statute.
C. Judicial Review of Contested Case Decisions in South
Carolina
Once the final decision is rendered, either by the ALJ or by the
24 See Guerard v. Whitner, 276 S.C. 521, 280 S.E.2d 539 (1981).
25 See Zeigler, supra note 20, at 48.
See DHEC v. Oswald, No 94-ALJ-07-0160 (1996) (regulation requiring
a showing of need repealed).
27 See Zeigler, supra note 20, at 49-51.
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agency, appeal is to the circuit court and then to the court of appeals
and, by writ of certiorari, to the supreme court. To date, there has been
limited judicial review of the ALJ decisions. Prior law, however,
required the courts to give substantial deference to the decision of
administrative agencies. Findings of fact are sustained on appeal if they
are supported by substantial evidence.2" The APA itself states that
"[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."29  Findings of fact,
however, can be reversed or modified if they are "clearly erroneous in
view of the substantial evidence on the whole record,"3° or if substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the finding,
inferences, conclusions or decisions have been affected by an error of
law.3' Moreover, the courts may defer to the agency's interpretation of
the statute.32 Mixed questions of law and fact are entitled to the same
deference. However, the court may reverse for any error of law.
The courts are apparently providing the same deference to the
decision of an ALJ as they did to an administrative agency.33 This is
justified, in part, because the Division is an agency, and the APA
requires the courts to grant deference to "agency" decisions. Judicial
review is unlikely to provide much guidance on administrative
procedure because of the few cases appealed to the courts and the
deferential standard of review.
D. The ALJ Division and Agency Review in Perspective
The General Assembly chose a model of administrative
procedure that gives the ALJs unusual independence in about three-
fourths of their cases in which the ALJ makes the final decision, subject
only to judicial review. In the remaining cases the ALJ decision is
subject to agency review. Of the 481 cases filed in the last four fiscal
2 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Smith, 327 S.C. 528, 534, 489 S.E.2d. 674, 677
(Ct. App. 1997).
29 S.C. Code Ann. 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 1997).
o Welch Moving & Storage Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 301 S.C. 259, 391
S.E.2d 556 (1990).
"' See Stephen v. Avins Constr. Co., 324 S.C. 334, 336, 478 S.E.2d 74, 75
(Ct. App. 1996).
32 See Faile v. S.C. Employment Security Comm., 267 S.C. 536, 540, 230
S.E.2d 219, 221-22 (1976) (citations omitted).
13 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Smith, 327 S.C 528, 535, 489 S.E.2d 674, 678
(Ct. App. 1997).
Fall. 1998 Report to the Judicial Council on the ALJ Statute
XVIII Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 384
years,' thirty-three cases have been appealed to the agency. Of those,
twenty-one were affirmed, one affirmed in part and reversed in part, and
five were reversed.35 Seven others were resolved or dismissed without
a decision on the appeal by the agency. Thus, of the 481 cases heard
by the division, twenty-eight went to appellate decision by the agency,
producing five reversals, and one partial reversal. The DHEC board
reversed the denial of a certificate of need in one case, and in the
remaining five cases, the OCRM reversed the AL. In those cases, one
was because the applicant was not required to demonstrate a need for
the full 100 feet of the dock, contrary to the finding of the AU, 36 and
the four other cases reversed the ALJs interpretation of the agency's
regulation regarding docks. Two of these cases concerned the location,
and two the size of the dock.37 In all five cases the agency board
apparently reversed decisions which were inconsistent with the
agency's prior interpretation of the regulation.
Several conclusions can be drawn from these data. First, the
number of appeals of an ALJ decision to the agency is small. Less than
10% of the 481 cases filed in the Division involving DHEC and DNR
were appealed to the agency. Moreover, the agency affirmed
approximately three-fourths of the AU decisions. Thus, almost all
cases were either consistent with agency policy, or at least, acceptable
enough for it not to take an appeal. The small number of appeals,
however, does not mean that they are unimportant. The DHEC and
OCRM cases are the more complex ones before the Division and it is
3' The number of cases involving DHEC and DNR as indicated in the
Annual Reports of the Division are as follows:
Fiscal Year 1993-94 -- 48 cases 25.0% of caseload
Fiscal Year 1994-95 -- 131 cases 18.2% of caseload
Fiscal Year 1995-96-- 147 cases 23.7% of caseload
Fiscal Year 1996-97 -- 155 cases 23.6% of caseload
31 See Chart Attached as Exhibit 1.
36 See DHEC v. Oswald, No 94-ALJ-07-0160 (1996).
37 In two cases the agency rejected the ALJ's decision to permit a larger dock
for recreational purposes. See DHEC v. Bessinger, 94-ALJ-0207-CC (1995); DHEC
v.Hooser, 94-ALJ-07-0372-CC (1995). Two involved a regulation requiring docks
to stop at the first navigable creek, and reversed the ALJ's decision requiring the
owner to align the dock to reach the first navigable stream, even if it could be avoided
by placing the dock in another location. See Norris v. Trott, 95-ALJ-07-0744-CC
(1997); Mikell v. DHEC, 96-ALJ-07-0447-CC (1997).
$'~ ReO o~nrt to the Judicial Council on the ALJ Statute
reasonable to assume those cases in which the agency and the ALJ
disagree raise important issues, and have a significant impact on the
agency and its enforcement of statutes committed to it. Nevertheless,
the appeal to the agency is not being used routinely, nor does it appear
that the agencies are continually disagreeing with the results of the
contested case.38
Second, the cases that were reversed are an indication of what
the agency considers important. At least four and possibly five cases
reversed interpretations of the regulations by the AJ that were
inconsistent with the agency's prior interpretation. The appeals can be
viewed as an agency attempt to restore consistency of interpretation of
important regulations. 39 As noted above, in two cases the agency
rejected larger docks for entertainment purposes, and two appeals
rejected an interpretation of the "nearest navigable stream" to require
particular placement of the docks. The number of docks in the state
imposes a particular need for consistency. New interpretations may
substantially alter the meaning of the regulation, and once adopted are
applicable to all. Thus, individual changes, small in each case, may
have tremendous ramifications for the enforcement of the regulatory
scheme.
That appeals are used to restore consistency of interpretation
suggests that the appellate route does serve an important function from
the agency's point of view, particularly when not used indiscriminately.
It also suggests that agencies value and need consistent interpretation
to function efficiently. As noted above, the problem of consistency also
occurs when different ALJs decide the same issue differently. The full
scope of this problem may be hidden. Only about 25% of decisions are
subject to any agency review, so in approximately three-fourths of the
cases there is no effective way for an agency to present and resolve
these inconsistencies.
This also suggests that there may be more uncertainty in the
" In the first two years, the Division reversed approximately 20% of agency
decisions (8 of 42 cases involving DHEC). See Eileen S. Githens, Two Years with the
ALJ Division, S.C. Lawyer (May /June 1996) at 45. Through the fall of 1997, the
number of final decisions reviewed by agencies was less than 10% of the cases filed.
This suggests that a large percentage of decisions that are adverse to the agency are
not appealed to the agency.
" See Zeigler, supra note 20 at 49-51.
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current administrative procedure. An ALT is not bound to adopt the
agency position, nor is an individual ALJ bound to adopt the position
previously adjudicated. The opportunity to overturn agency positions
may encourage more contested cases, particularly those involving
important or controversial issues, because the final decision is one
reached de novo.
Third, the benefits of agency review come at the cost of another
layer of review in the process. On average, an appeal to the agency
takes approximately 180 days from date of appeal to the date of agency
decision. There is a corresponding increase in expense as well as delay
in the project when the ALJ decision is appealed to the agency.
E. Other Alternatives
1. Rule-Making as a Response to the Need for
Consistency in Adjudication
One agency response is to develop policy by promulgating
regulations which will bind ALJs.4 ° Commentators have always
preferred rule-making to adjudication as a means to develop and
establish policy because of its full opportunity for comment. Rule-
making, however, has its limitations. First, it is not possible to
anticipate all issues that might arise. Any regulatory process inevitably
must provide discretion to handle those unanticipated issues. It is
precisely this discretion that is at issue when the ALJ is not bound to
follow the judgment of the agency.
Moreover, the rule-making process in South Carolina is lengthy
and complicated. The agency must give notice in the State Register of
a drafting period with not less than thirty days for comments and a
public hearing.4" An AL presides at hearings on regulations to be
promulgated by agencies that have single directors and, after the close
of the record, issues a written report including the need and
reasonableness of the proposed regulation.42 The General Assembly
may request an economic assessment of any regulation that has a
substantial economic impact, and the agency must submit to the
Division of Research and Statistics of the State Budget and Control
Board a preliminary assessment on regulations that will have a
40 See Zeigler, supra note 20, at 35-37.
4' See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-1 10(A)(Supp. 1997).
2 See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-1 10(A)(3)(g)(Supp. 1997).
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substantial economic impact.43 The Division of Research and Statistics
must then publish, within sixty days of the public hearing, a final
assessment report." All of the notices have to be published in the State
Register, and its publication schedule imposes additional time delays
since it is published once a month, and requires that material be
submitted a few weeks before publication. The regulation must be
submitted to the legislature for its review within one year of the
commencement of the drafting process. 45 Thereafter, it is referred to
the appropriate committee where, if no action is taken, it becomes
effective 120 days after presentment. 46 However, the committee may
determine that it will not approve the regulation as drafted, and after
notifying the agency, it can withdraw and resubmit the regulation within
thirty days. If regulations subsequently promulgated, contain
substantive changes not considered or discussed by the public
comments, the changes must be processed as a new regulation.47
Although the AIls decisional independence may lead agencies
to adopt regulations to restrict that discretion, it is a lengthy and
difficult process, and the regulation that emerges may be different from
originally proposed by the agency. Consequently rule-making will not
resolve the problem.
2. Deference to Agency Positions by Statute or
Practice
As noted above, courts, by statute, must defer to agencies in
matters committed to the agency discretion. The substantial evidence
standard permits agency fact-finding to stand, absent an abuse of
discretion, although other fact-finders could draw different conclusions
from the same evidence. Likewise, agency interpretations of statutes
and regulations are entitled to deference by courts. ALJs, however,
need not accord such deference to agency positions on fact-finding or
its interpretations of statutes or regulations. The concept of a central
panel of neutral decision-makers does not require complete
independence from the agency interpretations of its statutory mandate.
Statutory direction, or a practice, of deference to agency policy
41 See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-115 (B) (Supp. 1997).
" See id.
41 See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-120 (Supp. 1997).
' See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-125 (C) (Supp. 1997).
41 See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-125(E) (Supp. 1997).
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positions and interpretations of statutes and regulations, similar to that
required of courts, would eliminate a major cause of inconsistent
decision making.
3. Procedure for En Banc Consideration of Issues
A second and complementary procedure for establishing a
uniform position, when there are conflicting ALJ decisions, is the use
of en banc review by the Division. En banc review is the standard
method of resolving inconsistent determinations among panels. A
similar result would follow from a practice that treats prior opinions as
binding on the ALJs. This is the method in the United States Courts of
Appeals. The rationale is that the first decision is a decision of the
court and binds the court absent a rehearing en banc or an opinion of
the Supreme Court.48
F. Summary on the Issue of Agency Review
The extent of agency review of ALJ decisions is a policy
judgment committed to the General Assembly. By any measure, the
ALJ Division has succeeded in standardizing procedure in contested
cases, and providing fair, speedy and neutral adjudications. The
appellate procedure is a small part of the operation of the Division, but,
merits careful attention because of the importance of the cases involved.
The legislature's initial decision, made in light of the prior practice of
unrestricted agency review, was to provide for review only to certain
agencies. The AL's decisions are the final agency action in virtually all
cases. Even in those cases subject to appeal, the number of appeals is
small, and most appeals affirm the decision of the ALJ. As suggested
above, agency review provides an opportunity for the agency to
establish consistency in interpretation, but it is not clear that the review
board properly applies the statutory standard of review in all cases, and
it is an additional layer of review increasing the time and cost of
contested cases. There is some indication of a need for procedures or
policies that result in consistency of interpretation within the Division
so that both the agency and the litigants can have more predictability,
but it is very difficult to assess the dimensions of the problem. If
" See, e.g., Davis v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1976).
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deemed substantial, there are several ways to address this issue by
adopting internal procedures that would provide consistent
interpretation. Amendment of the statute to eliminate agency review
would reduce the expense of contested cases and the time to final
decision, but may lead to greater differences between the policies of the
agency and those expressed in individual ALJ decisions in contested
cases. That judgment is committed to the legislature.
IV. Appeal to the Circuit Court
A. Introduction
A second issue to be considered is the appropriate court to
review administrative decisions, whether made by the ALJ or by the
agency. All litigants in administrative law cases are guaranteed judicial
review by the State Constitution. 9 Appeals from the AL's decision,
or from the agency, when it makes the final agency decision, are to the
circuit court.50 Even before the APA, judicial review could be had by
an action in the circuit court for an injunction, declaratory judgment,
writ of certiorari or mandamus.5 1 The circuit court hears the matter as
an appellate court, and applies the standard of review contained in the
APA. The circuit court's decision may be appealed to the court of
appeals and the supreme court.52
The designation of the trial court as the initial court for judicial
review appears deliberate. The Model State Administrative Procedure
Act, upon which our act is based, provides for review in the trial
court. 3 South Carolina's APA also provides for actions in the trial
court regarding the promulgation of regulations. 4 Perhaps more
41 SeeS.C. Const. Art. I, § 22. No person shall be finally bound by a judicial
or quasi-judicial decision of an administrative agency affecting private rights except
on due notice and an opportunity to be heard; nor shall he be subject to the same
person for both prosecution and adjudication; nor shall he be deprived of liberty or
property unless by a mode of procedure prescribed by the General Assembly, and he
shall have in all such instances the right of judicial review.
" See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-380(a)(1) and 1-23-610(B) and (C)(Supp.
1997).
" See David E. Shirley, SOUTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Chap. VII
p. 7-13 to 7-17 (1989).
52 See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-390 (1976).
5 See 15 Uniform Laws Annotated § 5-104 (1990).
14 See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-150(b) (1976) (declaratory judgment action
challenging regulation that interferes with legal rights).
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importantly, at the time the APA was adopted the only appellate body
was the state supreme court. A review in the trial court provided a two-
step appellate process. The circuit court also acted at that time, and
today, as an appellate body on appeals from some decisions of the
master in equity,"5 the probate court 6 and the magistrates court.5 The
circuit court shares concurrent jurisdiction over some matters with
these courts. Thus, directing the initial appeals from those courts to the
circuit court centralized the procedure.5"
The creation of the court of appeals, however, turned a two-
stage appellate process into three stages, with potential review by the
circuit court, court of appeals and supreme court, all applying the same
standard of review. Recently, there have been efforts to reduce the
appellate role of the circuit court. The decisions of the master in equity
are now appealable to the supreme court if the order of reference gives
the master the power to make the final decision and specifies that the
appeal is to the supreme court.59 Legislation was introduced in 1997
that would make all appeals of masters' decisions to the appellate
court' thereby restoring a two-stage appellate process for these cases.
A similar argument can be made for eliminating the circuit court in the
appeal of administrative decisions. There is no longer a need for the
circuit court to hear appeals since the court of appeals was created, and
a proper allocation of judicial resources suggests that an appellate court
is more conversant with appellate matters and hence more efficient.
Finally, providing a direct appeal eliminates a redundant step in the
trial court, for there is no need for two courts to apply the same standard
of review to the same case before it reaches the supreme court.
One consideration however, is that the procedure in the circuit
court is less formal than in the court of appeals. Review is initiated by
s See S.C. Code Ann. § 14-11-85(A)(1) (Supp. 1997).
56 See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-1-308 (1987).
57 See S.C. Code Ann. § 18-7-10 (1989).
5' The master in equity is an adjunct to the circuit court in some counties.
The magistrates court and the circuit court have concurrent jurisdiction. See S.C.
Const. Art V. § 11; S.C. Code Ann. § 22-3-10 (Supp. 1997). Certain probate matters
may be removed to the circuit court. See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-1-302(c) (1989).
51 See S.C. Code Ann. § 14-11-85 (Supp. 1997).
' See H.R. Bill No. 3586.
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the timely filing of a petition in the circuit court.6 A responsive
pleading is not required, and the matter proceeds to hearing as
scheduled by the trial judge who may reach the matter sooner than the
court of appeals. Appeals to the court of appeals and supreme court
require the formal briefing process.62 In those cases where there is only
an appeal to the circuit court the procedure is easier, but if the case is
appealed further there is a redundant step in the process.
B. ALJ Review of Professional Licensing Decisions
The Division also reviews, on appeal, the "final decisions of
contested cases before professional and occupational licensing boards
or commissions within the Department of Labor, Licensing and
Regulation."63  The ALJ has the same power as a circuit judge and is
statutorily directed to use the same standard of review in considering
those appeals as a circuit court judge does when reviewing a final
agency action.' Appeal of the AL's decision is to the circuit court and
further appellate review is authorized.65 Thus, this class of contested
cases is subject to a four-stage appellate review involving the AJ, the
circuit court, the court of appeals and the supreme court. There is
nothing inherent in these cases requiring such extensive review, and
logic suggests that appellate review by the Division and by the circuit
court is redundant.
C. Summary on the Appropriate Court for Judicial Review
The choice of the appropriate court for the initial stage of
judicial review is a choice between the present three-step process,
starting in the circuit court, or the four-step process for appeals of
professional licensing decisions, and the more direct approach of all
appeals commencing in the appellate courts. The present statute may
provide a less expensive initial appeal to the circuit court, but at the cost
of lengthening the appellate process. Since the APA provides for the
same standard of review by any court hearing the appeal, there appears
little justification for appellate review prior to the appellate courts.
61 See Rule 74 SCRCP.
62 See Rule 207 SCACR.
63 S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 1997).
' See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 1997).
65 See id.
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V. Judicial Ethics and the AU Division
A. Introduction
ALJs exercise quasi-judicial powers, and the legislature made
them subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct found in Rule 501 of the
SCACR.66 The doctrine of separation of powers, however, prevents
the supreme court from exercising supervisory powers over executive
department officials, including ALJs.67 Consequently, the General
Assembly gave another executive agency, the State Ethics
Commission, responsibility for the enforcement and administration of
the Rules of Judicial Conduct. ALJs are also "public officials" within
the meaning of the Ethics Reform Act, and are bound by its
requirements.68
B. Duplicate Regulation
Two issues arise. First, the conduct of ALJs is subject to two
separate and distinct sets of rules. By comparison, members of the
judiciary are subject to a limited regulation under the State Ethics Act.
Generally, members of the judiciary are excluded from the definition of
a public official, and are not subject to the provisions relating to
lobbyists and lobbyists' principles or the rules of conduct for public
officials. These are matters governed under the Rules of Judicial
Conduct. However, members of the judiciary remain subject to the
campaign finance, campaign practices, public disclosure and disclosure
of financial interests statutes.69  This arrangement is logical because
the Rules of Judicial Conduct are broader and apply not only to the
performance of judicial functions, but also to aspects of administration
and private conduct that could intrude on a judge's impartiality or
fairness. For example, a judge is required to avoid the appearance of
impropriety in all professional and private activities,7 ° and to manage
6 See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-560 (Supp. 1997).
67 See State v. McLeod, 274 S.C. 81, 261 S.E.2d 303 (1979); State v.
Whittington, 278 S.C. 661, 301 S.E.2d 134 (1983). ALJs who are admitted to
practice in South Carolina remain subject to discipline as lawyers for conduct that
violates the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 407 SCACR.
68 See State Ethics Adv. Op. SEC. A095-007.
' See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 2-17-100(18); 8-13-100(27) and 8-13-1300(28)
(Supp. 1997).
70 See Rule 501 SCACR, Canon 2.
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extra judicial activities to minimize conflict with any judicial duties.71
A judge is more restricted in his political activity and in seeking judicial
office.72 A comparable application of the State Ethics Act to ALJs is
appropriate.
C. Sanctions
The second issue is the sanctions applicable to ALJs. Of
course, ALJs are subject to the criminal penalties provided in the Ethics
Act for violations of that statute, as well as any other criminal law. By
statute, the State Ethics Commission is responsible for the enforcement
and administration of the Code of Judicial Conduct under S.C. Code
Ann. § 8-13-320 (Supp. 1997), and it can impose sanctions for those
violations too. 73 The sanctions available to the Commission include a
recommendation of disciplinary or administrative action to the
executive responsible for the respondent.74 It can refer the case to the
Attorney General for appropriate action, including injunctive relief.
The Commission also can impose a monetary penalty including
a civil penalty of up to $2000 per violation of the Ethics Act, or order
forfeiture of gifts or profits received in violation of the statute.
Financial penalties are more appropriate when the primary concern is
financial misconduct, and the motivation for the violations relate to
monetary considerations. However, many of the provisions of the Code
of Judicial Conduct do not relate to financial conduct. Also, the
supreme court does not impose monetary penalties for violations of
judicial conduct. More troublesome is the Commission's authority to
"void nonlegislative state action obtained in violation of the chapter."76
This power seems particularly inappropriate in cases involving ALJs
7' See Rule 501 SCACR, Canon 5.
72 See Rule 501 SCACR, Canon 5 (g).
" S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-560 (Supp. 1997).
7 The Chief Administrative Law Judge is responsible for the administration
of the Division. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-570 (Supp. 1997). In cases involving the
Chief Administrative Law Judge, the report is sent to the governor. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 8-13-320(10)(k) (Supp. 1997).
75 The court may order lawyers to make restitution to clients. See, e.g., In
re Holler, 329 S.C. 395, 496 S.E.2d 627 (1998).
76 S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-320(10)(1) (Supp. 1997). This provision could be
interpreted to permit the State Ethics Commission to reverse a decision of the ALJ
involved, which presents very interesting problems of the interrelationship of agencies,
and perhaps the judiciary.
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because it could affect a case in litigation.
It appears that ALJs are not subject to any of the sanctions
provided by the Code of Judicial Conduct. The AU statute only refers
to Supreme Court Rule 501 which is only the Code. The sanctions are
found in Rule 502 SCACR. In the absence of statutory authorization,
there is no basis for the Commission to impose the sanction available
under Rule 502 SCACR. Moreover, it can be argued that the most
severe sanction available under Rule 502 should not be available to the
Commission. The supreme court may sanction a judge by reprimand,
public or private, and suspension, with, or without pay." If there has
been an indictment or conviction for a felony, the supreme court may
impose an interim suspension. Similarly, a judge can be suspended if
there is evidence that a judge poses a "substantial threat of serious harm
to the public or to the administration of justice.. ,,.8 The power to
suspend a judicial officer is an extreme measure, but one appropriate to
an independent branch of the state government, particularly when that
power is exercised through the supreme court, whose Chief Justice is
the administrative head of the Judicial Department under the
Constitution.79 The rationale for the court having the power to suspend
judges, however, does not automatically extend to a sister agency of the
executive department. The General Assembly specifically designated
the AU Division as an agency within the Executive Department."° The
quasi judicial nature of its primary function requires that it be
independent of other agencies.
D. Summary on Enforcement of Judicial Code of Conduct
The General Assembly adopted several provisions that treat
AUs in the same manner as members of the judiciary, although they are
members of the Executive Branch. At the same time, Al~s have some
characteristics of a circuit judge. An AU must meet the same standards
for election to the position as a circuit judge.8' An AU may issue
" See Rule 502 SCACR (Rule 7 Grounds for Discipline: Sanctions Imposed;
Deferred Discipline Agreement).
78 Rule 502 SCACR (Rule 17 Interim Suspension).
71 See S.C. Const. art.V § 4.
0 See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-500 (Supp. 1997).
8' See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-5 10 and 520 (Supp. 1997).
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remedial writs and has the same power in chambers as a circuit judge.8 2
Circuit judges and ALJs are subject to the same ethical standards of the
Judicial Code of Conduct. 3 The logic of the ALJ statute strongly
suggests that ALJs should be treated the same way as judges under the
State Ethics Act, and not be subject to two sets of rules for the same
conduct.
This report suggests that the issue of sanctions for violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct should be reviewed at this time. The
sanctions available under the Ethics Act, applicable to ALJs for
violations of the Judicial Code, are primarily monetary and different
from the sanctions under the Code of Judicial Conduct. Moreover, the
Ethics statute may enable the commission to void an ALJ decision
which would be serious interference with the quasi judicial process in
contested cases. There is a need for clarification on these matters.
VI. Conclusion
There is no doubt that the Division has been successful in
providing prompt and fair adjudications in contested cases, and is a
substantial improvement over the prior system. Five years experience
with the operation of the Division has demonstrated this, as well as the
need to address issues which have developed in that period.
82 See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-630 (Supp. 1997).
3 See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-560 (Supp. 1997).
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